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AUDITOR'S ASSISTANT: A Knowledge 
Engineering Tool For Audit Decisions* 
Glenn Shafer, 
Prakash P. Shenoy, 
Rajendra P. Srivastava 
University of Kansas 
1. Introduction 
In recent years, there has been significant interest in developing expert 
systems for assistance in audit decisions [see e.g, Boritz and Wensley, 1988; 
Chandler, 1985; Hansen and Messier, 1986a, and 1986b; Leslie et al., 1986]. It 
is believed that use of such systems will facilitate audit decisions and make 
audits more efficient and effective. This appears to be the reason that major 
accounting firms are committing increasingly greater resources to developing 
such systems [see e.g., Boritz and Brown, 1986; Kelly, 1987; Shpilberg and 
Graham, 1986]. 
Most of the expert systems being developed are rule-based. While such 
systems have many attractive features such as modularity of knowledge-base, 
ease of updating knowledge-base, etc., they are not well-suited for coherent 
reasoning under uncertainty. This is because in rule-based systems, the user 
has no control over the chain of inference whereas, coherent reasoning under 
uncertainty requires controlled firing of rules [Shafer, 1987]. Because of this 
difficulty, some developers of expert systems have avoided dealing with 
uncertainties altogether [Kelly et al., 1986]. In domains where uncertain 
reasoning is unavoidable, heuristic approaches have been attempted with little 
success [Shortliffe and Buchanan, 1975; Duda et al., 1976]. In recent years, 
considerable theoretical work has been done on the subject of coherent 
uncertain inference using Bayesian probabilities and belief-functions [see e.g., 
Pearl, 1986; Kong, 1986; Shenoy and Shafer, 1986; Mellouli, 1987; Shafer, 
Shenoy and Mellouli, 1987; Lauritzen and Spiegelhalter, 1988; Shafer and 
Shenoy, 1988]. The expert system described in this article represents one of 
the first practical applications of these new techniques. 
The purpose of this paper is to describe an interactive tool called 
AUDITOR'S ASSISTANT (AA). The system, when fully developed, should 
* This research has been supported in part by grants from the Peat Marwick Foundation, the 
National Science Foundation grant No. IST-8610293 and General Research Fund of the University 
of Kansas. The authors are grateful for discussions and assistance with programming from Yen-Teh 
Hsia, Debra Zarley and Ragu Srinivasan. 
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enable its users (auditors) to construct a network of variables and evidence. 
The system will automatically aggregate all evidence that is entered and display 
the resulting beliefs in all variables in the network. The system will have the 
capability of using both the Bayesian and the belief-function formalisms for 
managing uncertainties. It will provide a graphic interface for constructing a 
network of variables and evidence and it will automatically revise beliefs in all 
variables as new pieces of evidence are entered. 
This paper is divided into four sections. Section 2 provides a detailed 
discussion of AUDITOR'S ASSISTANT. Section 3 discusses an example 
demonstrating the process of constructing a network of variables and evidence 
and aggregation of evidence using the belief-function calculus. The final section 
summarizes the results. A brief introduction to the theory of belief-functions is 
given in Appendix A. 
2. Auditor's Assistant 
AUDITOR'S ASSISTANT is an interactive system for assisting auditors in 
making audit decisions. AA's theoretical foundation is based on coherent 
management of uncertain inference. With this system, an auditor can graphi­
cally create a network of variables and evidence, input judgments about the 
degree of support provided by a piece of evidence to the variable it is linked to, 
and evaluate the resulting total belief in all variables in the network. An auditor 
can also use the system to decide which procedure or test to perform next and 
also to decide when sufficient evidence has been obtained to issue an opinion. 
In auditing the financial statements of a firm, there are two major 
conceptual tasks. First, an argument needs to be constructed. This is the 
process of organizing different pieces of evidence and the variables which they 
support. One formal result of this process is a network of variables and 
evidence. We shall refer to this network as a design [see Shafer and Cohen, 
1987]. The process of constructing a design cannot be easily automated. It has 
to be done by a human expert, i.e., an experienced auditor. However, we can 
assist the auditor in this process by providing examples in the form of templates 
and by checking certain technical conditions, e.g., the Markov property 
[Shafer, Shenoy and Mellouli, 1987; Shafer and Shenoy, 1988], that have to be 
satisfied. 
Second, once an argument is in place, evidence has to be collected, 
judgments about the degree of support provided by such evidence to variables 
have to be made, and these judgments have to be aggregated and evaluated for 
all variables in the tree. The collection of evidence and judgments of degree of 
support are tasks that have to be done by the auditor. However, the 
aggregation and evaluation of evidence can be automated. 
The process of collecting evidence, making judgments, and aggregating 
judgments is iterative. Items of evidence are evaluated as they are collected, 
and this evaluation influences what evidence is collected next. The decisions 
about what evidence to seek next is one aspect of control [Cohen, 1987; Shafer 
and Cohen, 1987]. Again, this is not easy to automate. The experienced auditor 
makes these decisions. However, an interactive system should assist the 
auditor in these decisions in two ways. First, the system should automatically 
aggregate evidence as it is obtained and entered into the system, and the 
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system should display the net effect of all evidence on all variables in the 
network. Second, the system should allow a what-if analysis by allowing its user 
to enter a hypothetical piece of evidence and displaying its effect on all the 
variables. The user should then be able to retract this hypothetical evidence. 
In general, as discussed in the professional standards [AICPA, 1987] and 
also in the academic literature [see, e.g., Graham 1985a-1985e], auditors 
gather three types of evidence. One type comes from reviews of the external 
and internal environments in which the business is operating. External 
environments include economic, social and political environments. Internal 
environments include management integrity, quality of management, structure 
of management, and the general business awareness of the management. A 
second type deals with the strength of internal accounting controls. A strong 
set of internal accounting controls may mean more reliable accounting data and, 
therefore, less need for substantive tests. The third type comes from 
performing substantive tests to determine directly whether account balances 
are fairly stated in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles. 
Such tests include analytical review procedures and direct tests of balances 
such as confirmations of receivables from customers. 
There are several formalisms to aggregate uncertain evidence, including 
the Bayesian probability calculus [Pearl, 1986; Shenoy and Shafer, 1986; 
Lauritzen and Spiegelhalter, 1988; Shafer and Shenoy, 1988] and Shafer's 
theory of belief-functions [Shafer, 1976; Shenoy and Shafer, 1986; Kong, 1986; 
Shafer, Shenoy and Mellouli, 1987; Mellouli, 1987]. These calculi differ in their 
need for structure, inputs, flexibility and computational complexity. The 
Bayesian probability calculus demands structure in the form of conditional 
independence, and it demands numerous inputs in the form of priors and 
conditional probabilities, but it is relatively efficient computationally. The belief-
function calculus offers more flexibility and demands less inputs, but it can be 
computationally more intensive than the Bayesian calculus. 
AUDITOR'S ASSISTANT uses the belief-function calculus to represent 
and aggregate evidence. Shafer and Srivastava [1989] have demonstrated the 
importance and relevance of belief-functions for audit decisions based on the 
structure of audit evidence. Since the belief-function calculus reduces to the 
Bayesian calculus when all inputs demanded by the Bayesian calculus are 
available, AA can also work with probabilities. 
Once a network is in place, the auditor conducts procedures and, on the 
basis of the results, he or she provides numerical degrees of support for the 
variable the evidence is linked to. Then, AA aggregates the evidence and 
maintains a display of the degrees of support provided by all evidence collected 
so far to all variables in the network. 
As it exists today, AA allows an auditor to construct only a tree of variables 
and evidence. No loops are allowed. However, AA is currently being updated to 
include arbitrary networks. The user creates the tree visually and interactively 
using a mouse as an input device. The nodes of the tree represent variables and 
the links between nodes represent relations between variables. The user has 
many options for manipulating the tree on the screen: moving a node by 
dragging it, collapsing a sub-tree into a node, etc. 
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3. An Example 
In this section we will describe the use of AA in a simple audit engage­
ment.1 
Suppose ABC Hardware Co. is a small wholesale distributor of hardware 
located in the Midwest. Most of ABC's customers are retail hardware stores. 
Srifer & Co. has been asked to perform an annual audit of ABC's financial 
statements. 
3.1. Constructing a Network of Variables and Evidence 
Srifer & Co. has audited ABC Hardware's financial statements for the last 
four years. After reviewing the previous years' working papers and under­
standing the client's business environment, the audit team (consisting of a 
senior, manager and partner) constructs a network of variables and evidence 
related to accounts receivables (AR) and allowance for bad debts (ABD). For 
simplicity of exposition, we assume that the audit team has decided not to 
depend on the internal accounting controls in the sales and collection cycle. 
Thus, the audit team will depend only on the environmental factors, analytical 
review results, and some direct tests of balances. This network is shown in 
Figure 1. 
The rounded rectangular nodes represent variables that are of interest to 
the auditor. For example, the main variable in Figure 1 is whether net accounts 
receivable is fairly stated. Associated with each variable is a collection of 
mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive values. For example, the values 
associated with the net accounts receivable variable are nar (denoting that net 
accounts receivable is fairly stated) and —nar (denoting that net accounts 
receivable is not fairly stated). All variables in Figure 1 are binary-valued. A 
brief description of each variable is indicated inside the node. 
The circular nodes represent relations between the variables they are 
linked to. For example, net accounts receivable is fairly stated if and only if both 
accounts receivable and allowance for bad debts are fairly stated. Also, 
accounts receivable is fairly stated if and only the following objectives have 
been met: completeness, ownership, adequate disclosure, proper classification, 
validity and valuation (see, e.g., Arens and Loebbecke [1988], for further 
discussion of these objectives). Formally, a relation is modeled as a belief-
function. For example, the relation between net accounts receivable, accounts 
receivable and allowance for bad debts can be represented in terms of a basic 
probability assignment function m as follows (see Appendix A for a definition of 
m): 
m({(nar,ar,abd), (~ nar,ar, ~abd),(~ nar, ~ ar,abd),(~ nar, ~ar, ~ abd)}) = 1. 
The rectangular nodes represent evidence. A description of the procedures 
and tests leading to the evidence shown in Figure 1 is given in Table 1. The 
links between evidence nodes and variable nodes indicate that the evidence 
provides some support for the variables it is linked to. For example, in Figure 1 
1 The main purpose of this example is to illustrate the use of AA in planning and evaluation 
decisions. The numerical inputs used in the example are purely for illustration purposes. 
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Figure 1. A network of variables and evidence for ABC Hardware. 
evidence Env. 1.1 provides support directly to the net accounts receivable 
variable. 
Formally, each piece of evidence is modeled as a belief-function on the set 
of possible values of the variables it is linked to. For example, if the outcome of 
the Env. 1.1 procedure results in a 60% degree of support for nar, then this 
piece of evidence is represented in the system as follows: 
m({nar}) = 0.60, m({nar, ~ nar}) = 0.40. 
Functions of this type (where a certain degree is committed to one value of a 
variable and the rest is uncommitted) are called simple support functions. We 
expect most of the evidence to be of this type. Thus, in order to make a 
judgment about a piece of evidence, an auditor needs to decide whether the 
evidence supports the affirmative or negative value of a variable, and the 
degree (a number between 0 and 1) to which it does so. 
At the outset of the engagement (before any tests or procedures have been 
performed), a network of variables and evidence, such as the one shown in 
Figure 1, serves as a plan for performing the audit. Before a procedure is 
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TABLE 1. Description of procedures and tests leading to evidence shown in 
Figure 1. 
An. Rev. 1.1 Review AR journal for unusual items and compare individual 
customer balances over a stated amount with previous years. 
An. Rev. 1.2 a. Compare allowance for bad debt as a percentage of 
accounts receivable with previous years. 
b. Compare number of days accounts receivable outstanding 
with previous years. 
c. Compare bad debt expense as a percentage of gross sales 
with previous years. 
Env. 1.1 Review the competence and trustworthiness of the account­
ing personnel working in sales transactions. 
Env. 1.2 Review management's credit policy. 
ST 1.1 Trace a sample of accounts from the subsidiary ledger to the 
aged trial balance. 
ST 1.2 Review the minutes of the board of directors' meetings for any 
pledged or factored accounts receivable. Also inquire of man­
agement whether any receivables are pledged or factored. 
ST 1.3 Review the receivables listed on the aged trial balance for 
notes and related party receivables. 
ST 1.4 Trace a sample of accounts from the trial balance to the 
related subsidiary ledger. 
ST 1.5 Confirm accounts receivables from customers. 
ST 1.6 Discuss with credit manager the likelihood of collecting older 
accounts over 120 days and evaluate whether the receivables 
are collectible. 
performed, it is represented in the system as a vacuous belief-function (see 
Appendix A for the definition of a vacuous belief-function). Propagating all these 
belief-functions results in zero belief for each value for all variables in the 
network. In other words, before collecting any evidence, the auditor is 
completely ignorant about whether the financial statements are fairly presented 
or contain a material error. However, once a test is performed, the auditor 
makes a numerical judgment about the degree of support provided by the test 
to the variable the evidence is linked to in the network. After this is entered 
into the system, the system propagates the evidence to all variables in the 
network and the revised beliefs for all variables are then displayed. 
At any stage of the audit, the auditor has to decide which procedures he or 
she is going to perform next. Of course, at any stage of the audit, depending on 
the results of the tests already conducted, an auditor may decide that certain 
procedures are unnecessary. On the other hand, an auditor may need to change 
his or her plan to include more tests because the tests planned for do not 
provide the necessary evidence to issue an opinion. 
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3.2. Planning and Aggregation of Evidence 
To illustrate the planning of the audit and the aggregation of evidence, we 
will further simplify the example. Assume that the audit team has concluded 
that the objectives of completeness, ownership, adequate disclosure, and proper 
classification have been met without any reservations. The objectives yet to be 
verified are validity and valuation for AR. The network relevant to this 
situation is shown in Figure 2. The rectangular nodes are shown with a dotted 
fill in Figure 2 to indicate that none of these procedures has been performed 
yet. Since no procedures have been performed yet, no support is available to 
any of the values of the variables as shown in Figure 2. For each variable in the 
network, there are two numbers shown inside the rectangular box at the 
bottom. The first of these two numbers indicates the total belief for the 
affirmative value of the variable. For example, for the NAR variable, 
Bel({nar}) = 0 in Figure 2. The second number indicates the total belief for the 
negative value of the variable. For example, for the NAR variable, 
Bel({ ~ nar}) = 0 in Figure 2. 
We will consider two different scenarios and the resulting evaluations about 
the fairness of NAR. 
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3.2.1. Scenario One 
Suppose that the audit team finds the management and accounting person­
nel to be competent and trustworthy (Env. 1.1). The audit team decides that 
this evidence supports nar to degree 0.60. Also, the results of the analytical 
review procedures (An. Rev. 1.1) show no unusual items and no apparent 
problems in AR balance. The team makes a judgment that this supports 'ar' to 
degree 0.60. These judgments are propagated through the network resulting in 
the beliefs shown in Figure 3. Notice that there is now an overall support of 
0.60 for the assertion that NAR is fairly presented and no support for the 
assertion that NAR is materially misstated (i.e., Bel({nar}) = 0.60, 
Bel({ ~nar}) = 0). Although there is no support for the assertion that NAR is 
materially misstated, there is a maximum 40% risk based on the two pieces of 
evidence that NAR could be materially misstated (i.e., Pl({~nar}) = 0.40 
where PI is a plausibility function related to the belief-function Bel by the 
relation Pl({ ~ nar}) = 1 - Bel({nar}). 
Let us assume that the audit team plans to conduct the audit so that they 
obtain at least 90% overall support for nar, i.e., targeted Bel({nar}) is 0.90. 
Note that the evidence from An. Rev. 1.1 provides no support yet to nar since 
no support for abd has yet been obtained from procedures, ST 1.6, An. Rev. 
1.2, and Env. 1.2 (remember that NAR is fairly stated only when AR and ABD 
Figure 3. The network of variables after performing Env. 1.1 and An. Rev. 1.1 in 
Scenario One. 
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are fairly stated). It should be noted that ar and the two objectives of ar (validity 
and valuation) in Figure 4 have 84% support from Env. 1.1 and An. Rev. 1.1. 
The 0.60 support for nar is entirely due to Env. 1.1. Therefore, the team 
decides to perform analytical review procedures for allowance for bad debts 
(An. Rev. 1.2) next. 
Suppose they find that the allowance is reasonable given the accounts 
receivable balance. Also, certain ratio analyses suggest that ABD is fairly 
presented. The team makes a conservative judgment that a 60% degree of 
support is obtained from this evidence for abd. The resulting network is shown 
in Figure 4. Thus, propagating the three judgments through the network 
results in an overall support for nar of 0.74 and no support for ~nar (i.e., 
Bel({nar}) = 0.74, Bel({~nar}) = 0). 
Next, since not enough support is available yet for nar, the team decides to 
perform substantive test procedures for validity and valuation of AR. (Of 
course, the team recognizes that certain substantive test procedures are 
required by the AICPA. For example, confirmations of AR from the customers 
is a requirement [AICPA, 1987, AU331]). The extent of testing would depend 
on the level of support desired by the team. Let us assume that they plan on 
achieving 80% support for validity of AR by tracing a sample of accounts from 
the aged trial balance to the related subsidiary ledger. The senior performs the 
Figure 4. The network after performing Env. 1.1, An. Rev. 1.1 and An. Rev. 1.2 in 
Scenario One. 
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test and finds no exceptions. The team makes a judgment that an 80% degree 
of support is obtained by the evidence for the validity objective. This evidence 
is entered into the system and the resulting network is shown in Figure 5. The 
overall support for nar is still 0.74. The reason for no change in the overall 
support for nar is that the evidence from ST 1.4 supports only the validity 
objective. There is no direct support yet for the valuation objective. Since both 
objectives have to be met for AR to be fairly presented, ST 1.4 provides no 
support by itself to the fair presentation of AR. However, the level of support 
shown in Figure 5 represents the overall support when all the items of 
evidence have been aggregated. 
As discussed earlier, AUDITOR'S ASSISTANT would have the capability 
of performing a what-if analysis for deciding the nature, timing, and extent of 
tests. In principle, the auditor can assume a certain level of support that he or 
she plans to obtain from a test procedure and see its impact on the overall 
support for the main assertion of interest. Of course, the decision about what 
test to perform next, and the extent of the test, depends on the auditor. The 
cost of performing a test has to be balanced with the level of support desired. 
Usually, analytical review procedures do not provide a high level of support 
unless the test involves statistical analyses. Similarly, making inquiries of the 
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Figure 5. The network after performing Env. 1.1, An. Rev. 1.1, An. Rev. 1.2 and ST 
1.4 in Scenario One. 
client provides a lower level of support. However, confirmation from third 
parties is considered to be reliable and it provides a higher level of support. 
Now suppose that the team decides to send a sample of positive confirma­
tions to the client's customers in order to achieve a 90% degree of support for 
the validity of AR. The confirmation test also provides support for the valuation 
objective to a great extent because the customer usually checks the account 
balance for accuracy. The audit staff analyzes the returned confirmations and 
finds no exceptions. The team, having reviewed the staffs work, makes a 
judgment that the confirmation test provides a 90% degree of support for the 
validity objective and an 85% degree of support for the valuation objective. For 
simplicity of exposition, we will assume that the above two judgments are 
independent. The resulting beliefs of all variables are shown in Figure 6. The 
overall support for nar is now 0.83 and there is still no support for ~nar (i.e., 
Bel({nar}) = 0.83, Bel({ ~nar}) = 0). 
Since the overall support for nar is still below the target level of 0.90, the 
team plans to perform some further tests. Since the support for ar is already 
quite high (Bel({ar}) = 0.98), they conclude that there is no need for further 
evidence that supports ar. However, support for abd is still low 
(Bel({abd}) = 0.84). Thus, they decide to meet with the credit manager to 
discuss whether the firm has any collectibility problems with their accounts (ST 
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Figure 6. The network after performing Env. 1.1, An. Rev. 1.1, An. Rev. 1.2, ST 1.4, 
and ST 1.5 in Scenario One. 
1.6). They find that there is no account that is more than 120 days overdue. 
Furthermore, all accounts seem to be quite good. The team makes a judgment 
that this evidence supports abd to degree 0.60. The resulting beliefs for the 
variables are shown in Figure 7. The overall support for nar is now 0.92 and 
there is no evidence to support ~nar (i.e., Bel({nar}) = 0.92, 
Bel({~nar}) = 0). 
At this stage, the audit team decides to conclude the audit since they have 
sufficient evidence to issue an opinion about the fairness of NAR. The audit 
team also knows that given the evidence, the maximum risk that NAR is 
materially misstated is only 8%. 
Although the audit team had initially planned to review ABC's credit policy 
(Env. 1.2), they do not perform this test since, on the basis of tests already 
conducted, they have a sufficiently high belief that NAR is fairly stated. Without 
a formal analysis of the type shown above, perhaps an audit team may end up 
doing more tests than necessary. AUDITOR'S ASSISTANT, when fully 
developed, should provide assistance to auditors in deciding when sufficient 
evidence has been collected to issue an opinion. 
3.2.2. Scenario Two 
In this case, assume that the results of Env. 1.1, An. Rev. 1.1, ST 1.4, and 
Figure 7. The network after performing Env. 1.1, An. Rev. 1.1, An. Rev. 1.2, ST 1.4, 
ST 1.5, and ST 1.6 in Scenario One. 
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ST 1.5 are the same as in Scenario One. The results of An. Rev. 1.2 and ST 1.6 
are different from the ones described above. 
Suppose that the analytical review procedure An. Rev. 1.2 performed by 
the senior has revealed that the allowance for bad debts may be understated in 
relation to this year's accounts receivable balance. Also the AR balance has 
increased significantly compared to the credit sales, implying that a more liberal 
credit policy has been adopted this year, compared to the past. Furthermore, 
the collection of receivables is slow. Based on this evidence, the audit team 
makes a judgment that ABD is understated to degree 0.25. The aggregate 
beliefs in all variables are now shown in Figure 8. The overall beliefs in nar and 
~nar are 0.53 and 0.12, respectively. The maximum risk of NAR being 
materially misstated is 0.47 (i.e., Pl({~nar}) = 1 -Bel({nar}) = 0.47). 
The audit team now decides to review the client's credit policy (Env. 1.2). 
The senior performs the review and finds that this year, the client has been 
quite liberal in granting credit. He attributes the increase in AR balance this 
year to the firm's liberal credit policy. The team makes a judgment that the 
evidence supports ~abd to degree 0.40. 
The senior also meets with the credit manger to discuss the firm's credit 
policy (ST 1.6). The credit manager agrees with the senior's assessment that 
allowance for bad debts may be understated. Based on this evidence, the audit 
Figure 8. The network after performing Env. 1.1, An. Rev. 1.1, ST 1.4, ST 1.5, and 
An. Rev. 1.2 in Scenario Two. 
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team makes a judgment that supports ~abd to degree 0.80. This judgment, 
when combined with the previous findings, yields an overall support of 0.80 for 
~abd (see Figure 9). Therefore, the audit team decides at this point to 
propose an adjustment for ABD. No adjustment need be proposed for AR since 
the overall support for ar is 0.95, which is above their target level. 
4. Summary 
AUDITOR'S ASSISTANT is not a rule-based system. The knowledge-base 
of AA is a network of variables and evidence. Since each auditing engagement 
is unique, a network of variables and evidence has to be constructed by the 
user. There are several ways in which the system assists the user with this 
task. First, the graphics user interface of AA is designed to make the task of 
constructing a network as easy and intuitive as possible. Second, the user does 
not have to start from scratch. Instead, (s)he can start with a template and 
modify it to fit the engagement at hand. The system automatically handles 
technical aspects of network construction such as ensuring that the network 
satisfies the Markov property. Also, the system (when fully developed) should 
automatically reduce a non-tree network to a tree by clustering variables and 
using the resulting clustered tree to propagate the evidence. At this time, the 
Figure 9. The network after performing Env. 1.1, An. Rev. 1.1, ST 1.4, ST 1.5, 
An. Rev. 1.2, Env. 1.2 and ST 1.6 in Scenario Two.  
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system is only capable of propagating belief-functions in networks that are 
already trees. 
The user can use the network of variables and evidence as a planning 
device. At each stage, AA will display the beliefs for each variable in the 
network as a function of the evidence that has been collected and entered into 
the system. At each stage, the user needs to decide what test or procedure to 
perform next. AA can assist in this decision by performing a what-if analysis 
and indicating the degree of belief provided to the main variable of interest as a 
function of the test results. The auditor can then choose between different 
tests and sample sizes based on cost of test and increase in degree of belief for 
the main variable of interest. 
When there is sufficient belief for the main variable of interest, the auditor 
can issue an appropriate opinion. 
In summary, it is useful to think of AUDITOR'S ASSISTANT as a 
knowledge engineering tool instead of as an expert system. Coherent reasoning 
under uncertainty requires construction of an argument. Once an argument is 
in place, aggregation of evidence is easily automated. 
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Appendix A 
A Primer on The Theory of Belief Functions 
Here we shall present the basics of the theory of belief-functions. See 
Shafer [1976] for details. 
Let X denote a variable with possible values x1, . . . ,xn. We shall refer to 
the set of all possible values of a variable (exactly one of which is true) as a 
frame of discernment. A basic probability assignment (bpa) function on a frame 0 
is a function m : 2 Ө - [0,1] such that 
m(A)≥0 for all Aε2 Ө , m(ø) = 0, and Σ{m(A)|Aε2Ө} = 1 
Intuitively, m(A) represents the degree of belief assigned exactly to A (the 
proposition that the true value of X is in the set A). A basic probability 
assignment function corresponds to a probability mass function in Bayesian 
probability theory. Whereas a probability mass function is restricted to 
assigning probability masses only to singleton values of variables, a bpa 
function is allowed to assign masses to sets of values without assigning any 
mass to the individual values contained in the sets. For example, if we have 
absolutely no knowledge about the true value of a variable, we can represent 
this situation by a bpa function as follows: 
m(Ө) = 1, m(A) = 0 for all other Aε2 Ө . 
Such a function is called a vacuous bpa function. Note that in Bayesian 
probability theory, the only way to express total ignorance is to assign a mass of 
1/n to each value where n is the total number of possible values. Thus, in 
Bayesian probability theory we are unable to distinguish between equally likely 
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values and total ignorance. The theory of belief-functions offers a richer 
semantics. 
Associated with a bpa function are two related functions called belief and 
plausibility. A belief-function is a function Bel:2Ө—[0,1] such that 
Bel(A) = Σ{m(B)|B A}. 
Whereas m(A) represented the belief assigned exactly to A, Bel(A) 
represents the total belief assigned to A. Note that Bel(ø) = 0 and Bel(Ө) = 1 
for any bpa function. For the vacuous bpa function m, the corresponding belief-
function Bel is given by 
Bel(Ө) = 1, and Bel(A) = 0 for all other Aε2 Ө . 
A plausibility function is a function P1:2Ө—[0,1] such that 
Pl(A) = Σ{m(B)|B A ≠ ø } 
P1(A) represents the total degree of belief that could be assigned to A. Note 
that P1(A) = 1 -Bel( ~A) where ~A represents the complement of A in Ө, 
i.e., ~ A = Ө - A. Also note that Pl(A) ≥ Bel(A). For the vacuous bpa function, 
the corresponding plausibility function is 
P1(ø) = 0, and Pl(A) = 1 for all AεӨ. 
If a bpa function m is also a probability mass function (i.e., all the probability 
masses are assigned only to singleton subsets), then Bel(A) = Pl(A) = 
Σ{m({xi}|xiεA} = probability of proposition A. 
If m1 and m 2 are bpa functions representing two independent pieces of 
evidence, then we can combine them using Dempster's rule of combination and 
obtain a new bpa function, denoted by m1 m2, representing the aggregated 
evidence as follows: 
m1 m2(A) = K - 1 Σ{m 1 (B 1 )m 2 (B 2 ) |B 1 B 2 = A} if A≠ø, and m 1 m2(ø) = 0 
where K =1l-Σ{m 1 (B 1 )m 2 (B 2 ) |B 1 B 2 = ø}. The above definition assumes 
that K≠0. If K = 0, then the two pieces of evidence contradict each other 
completely, and it is not possible to combine such evidence. 
Let us illustrate Dempster's rule of combination by means of two examples. 
Example 1 
Suppose that the variable under consideration is the validity of accounts 
receivable with frame {v, ~ v}. The results of substantive test 1.4 lead to the 
bpa function m1 as follows: 
m1({v}) = .8, m1({v,~v}) = .2 
Furthermore, results of substantive test 1.5 lead to the bpa function m 2 as 
follows: 
m2({v}) = 0.9, m2({v, ~v}) = . l 
Combining m1 and m 2 by Dempster's rule leads to the bpa function mxv 
m 2 as follows: 
m1 m2({v}) = .72 + .08 + .18 = .98, 
m1 m2({v, ~v}) = .02. 
The details of Dempster's rule are shown in Figure 10. In this example, 
there is no conflict between the two pieces of evidence, i.e., K = 1. 
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Figure 10. Dempster's rule for Example 1 
(.8)(.9)=.72,{v} {v}={v} 
(.8)(.1)=.08,{v} {v,~v}={v} 
(.2)(.9)=.18,{v,~v} {v}={v} 
(.2)(.1)=.02,{v,~v} {v~v}={v,~v} 
Example 2 
Suppose that the variable under consideration is the fairness of allowance 
for bad debts with frame {abd, — abd}. The results of an analytical review test 
lead to a bpa function m1 as follows. 
m1({abd}) = 0.8, m1({abd, ~abd}) = 0.2 
However, an environmental review uncovers the fact that one of the 
client's major customers has filed for Chapter 11 and may not be in a position to 
pay its bills. Let us represent this evidence as follows: 
m2({~abd}) = 0.1, m2({abd, ~abd}) = 0.9 
Combining these two pieces of evidence leads to the aggregated bpa 
function: 
m1 m2({abd}) = .72/0.92= .78 
m1 m2({~ abd}) = .02/0.92 = .02 
m1 m2({abd, ~abd}) = .18/0.92= .20 
The details of Dempster's rule are shown in Figure 11. Note that in this 
case the evidence is conflicting (K = 1- .08 = 0.92) and so we end up 
renormalizing the bpa function so that the values add to 1. 
In general, Dempster's rule of combination has the following properties: 
(i) Commutativity: m 1 m 2 = m 2 m 1 
(ii) Associativity: (m1 m2) m 3 = m 1 (m2 m3) 
(iii) In general, m 1 m1≠m1. The bpa m 1 m 1 will favor the same subsets as 
m1, but it will do so with twice the weight of evidence, as it were. 
(iv) If m1 is vacuous, then m 1 m 2 = m 2. 
In Bayesian probability theory, evidence is aggregated using Bayes's rule. It 
is easy to show that Bayes's rule is a special case of Dempster's rule of 
combination. 
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Figure 11. Dempster's rule for Example 2 
{abd,~abd 
{-abd} 
(.8)(.1)=.08,{abd}r(~abd}= ø 
.8 {abd,~abd} (.8)(.9)=. 72){abd} {abd,~abd}={abd} 
(.2)(.1)=.02,{abd,~abd} {~abd}={~abd} 
|abd,~abd} (.2)(.9)=.18,{ abd,~abd} {abd,~abd}={abd,~abd) 
In general, Dempster rule of combination has the following properties: 
(i) Commutativity: m1 m 2 = m2 m1 
(ii) Associativity: (m1 m2) m 3 = m1 (m2 m3) 
(iii) In general, m1 m 1 ≠m 1 . The bpa m1 m1 will favor the same subsets as m^ but it 
will do so with twice the weight of evidence, as it were. 
(iv) If m1 is vacuous, then m1 m 2 = m2. 
In Bayesian probability theory, evidence is aggregated using Bayes's rule. It is easy to show 
that Bayes's rule is a special case of Dempster's rule of combination. 
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